May
1995
A
New Dimension of Animal Rights
By Leena Vilkka |
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The old idea of natural rights, as it is found in Plato,
Aristotle, and the Stoics means natural law theory according to which
human beings have natural rights by nature. The Virginia Declaration
of Rights of 1776 argues along these lines: “All men [sic] are
by nature equally free and independent and have certain inherent rights,
of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot by any
compact deprive or divest their posterity.” In 1791, the French
Constitution espoused the idea of the natural rights of man: liberty,
prosperity, security and resistance of oppression.
I suggest that this old philosophical idea of natural rights/natural
law would be a fruitful model for animal rights. An animal’s right
to a painless life arises from the fact that animals are sentient beings
by nature. Natural animal rights accord rights to animals from the point
of animals as sentient beings.
Legal animal rights would be the most effective tool for taking the
intrinsic value of animals into moral account. Nowadays laws for animals
are arbitrary. In his book Inhumane Society, Michael W. Fox illustrates
the situation as follows: “A rabbit can be perceived, and therefore
treated, in a variety of ways, which influences its social and legal
standing. It could be a cuddly pet, a subject for high-school dissection
or research, a menu item, or the source of a pair of fur mittens. It
could be a farmer’s pest, a sportsman’s ‘worthy adversary,’
or a greyhound trainer’s lure. But nowhere is the rabbit valued
intrinsically, in and for itself, and projections create a spectrum
of attitudes that determines a rabbit’s ultimate social and legal
standing. But does the rabbit not suffer equally whether it is a pet,
a laboratory animal, or a ‘pest?’ Isn’t it just as
cruel, given the rabbit’s ability to experience pain, to torture
it in a laboratory or in an open field as it is in a home? Not according
to the law!”
I propose that in the law, the level of the rights of sentient beings
should be distinguished. The core of such rights should be the principle
of equality. As James Rachels says: “Individuals are to be treated
in the same way unless there is a relevant difference between them that
justifies a difference in treatment.” Animal rights should not
be additive as property rights are. Maybe animal rights should not rise
to the level of human rights, but animal rights should certainly extend
beyond property rights.
How much weight should animal interests deserve in the law? Animal rights
activists do not claim that animals should have human rights, but that
animals should have certain animal rights. The most important animal
right would be the right to psychical, physical, and social well-being.
This would include at least the right to a normal animal life of its
own kind, meaning at least: the right to appropriate liberty, the right
to individuality and to social relationships, and the right to be free
of pain.
The right to normal animal life means the right to live as the animal
that s/he is. Stephen Clark, writing in The Monist, proposes the important
idea of “self-owners” which means the owner-of-her/his-own-life.
Animals as sentient beings have their own life that is significant to
them. Clark describes his idea of “self-owners” as follows:
“ ‘self-owning’ is a category more widely extended
than we had thought. A being ‘owns itself’ if its behaviour
is the product of its own desires and beliefs, if it can locate itself
within the physical and social world, and alter its behaviour to take
account of other creatures’ lives and policies... Such self-owners
are, in the relevant sense, equals, and a just, liberal society cannot
allow them to be owned by others.”
Many philosophers and theorists have argued that animals cannot have
rights. Why not? Legal rights are surely made by humans: rights are
the products of human history, culture and politics. Surely, we humans
can give legal rights to animals as well as to other nonhuman objects
if we want to. It is a question of human decision, and of course strong
human interests in not giving rights to animals and nature exist.
People should have legal rights to protect animals. This human right
could be asserted best by giving legal rights to animals and nature.
Animal rights activists would have an effective tool to defend animals
against cruelty and inhumane treatment. We have strong property rights
in our legislation — it is ironic that sentient, living creatures
do not have rights as the owners of their own lives, but as the property
of humans.
I suggest that the first practical step would be to confirm the category
of sentient beings and confirm some legal rights for them. In our modern
laws, animals are categorized as property or raw material. This is surely
inadequate in the light of the understanding of animals as sentient
beings. It is important that the demands of people perceiving animals
as sentient beings be not simply ignored in our societies. The question
of animals will be the one big question which divides our societies
into those who perceive animals in terms of instrumental value and into
those who perceive them in terms of intrinsic value, with their own
rights. Of course, from the practical point of view, the position of
animal activists seems quite hopeless. Their demands on behalf of animals
as sentient beings are not taken seriously in the law and everyday morality.
However, I assume that the society which systematically ignores the
demands of animal activists (or other minority groups) cannot be a reasonable
or sustainable society. Increasing demands to perceive animals as sentient
beings also require more scientific study of what animals really are,
what it means to be a sentient being, and what are the practical and
social implications of this.
Leena Vilkka is an environmental philosopher and
researcher in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Helsinki,
Finland. She is also the chairperson of the Finnish Animal Rights Federation.
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