June/July
2006
A Rebel Walks out
for Peace
The Satya Interview with
Tadjadine Bechir Niame
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Tadjadine Bechir Niame with his sister, niece and nephew. Photo
by Wan Park |
After the April 30th rally in Washington to save Darfur, the U.S.
sent Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick to observe the peace
negotiations in Abuja, Nigeria. On May 5, 2006, the government of
Sudan and one faction of the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM), led
by Minni Minawi, signed the Darfur Peace Agreement drafted by the
African Union. The Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the other
faction of the SLM, led by Abdelwahid Muhamed El Nur, however, walked
out.
Representatives of all the rebel groups came to the U.S. after the talks in Abuja
to explain to politicians, universities, NGOs, individuals, and Darfurians in
exile, what the agreement means to the people of Darfur and why they took the
stance that they did.
It’s not every day that you get to speak to a rebel or learn what goes
on behind the scenes at the negotiation table at peace accords. Sangamithra
Iyerhad a chance to spend a morning with Tadjadine Bechir Niame, Deputy Secretary
of Humanitarian Reconstruction and Permanent Representative to the African Union
of Justice and Equality Movement, where he explained why he walked out for peace.
You represent the Justice and Equality Movement in Sudan. Your group refused
to sign the most recent peace agreement in Nigeria. Can you explain why?
Well, you need to have some background. Sudan is a country [made up of] six
regions—the
North, South, East, Center, Darfur and Kordofan. Darfur constitutes 20 percent
of the Sudanese population. Our brothers to the north—who are only five
percent of the population—have inherited the power from the British, and
they have continued imposing their will and dominance on the rest of Sudan for
the last 50 years. We work very hard to make them understand that we should share
power as well as wealth, but they have resisted just like any minority clinging
to power. At the moment, President Omar El Bashir, the vice president and the
assistant president are from the North. The key ministers—of defense, finance
and petrol—are from the North. So you find internal colonization from
the North to the rest of the states of Sudan.
That’s why people in the South were at war for almost the last 50 years
and have only signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement last July. The people
in the East are now in the process of having peace talks. People in Darfur
are fighting. People in Kordofan are fighting. People in the Center are fighting.
The only region with no fighting is the North, and even there, there are some
problems.
With this background, we the people of Darfur came out to eradicate political,
economic and social marginalization, and [hope to] make our people enjoy full
rights and full duties on an equal level with rest of Sudan. That is the main
objective of this movement.
After [the talks in Abuja] with the African Union and observers from the international
community, the agreement produced is far from addressing the real concerns and
interests of our people. It does not address the root causes of the conflict
and was not the result of a negotiation between the parties. That is a big problem.
That is why the Justice Equality Movement rejected it.
We have been telling the world the Sudan
government cannot disarm the Janjaweed because they are the Janjaweed.
They finance it, they control it, they command it and they support
it. |
Can you talk a bit more about your demands?
We have divided our team into three commissions: power sharing, wealth sharing
and security.
In 1994, this government divided Darfur into three states to undermine the identity
and the culture of the people, to make the states fight among themselves and
weaken the influence of the region. They even cut part of our region and annexed
it to the North. One key reason our people are fighting is we want to reunite
Darfur by having a regional government that enjoys executive, legislative and
judicial powers. We have been asking the power of the states to be given to the
people and proper representation in the capital, Khartoum. This was completely
ignored.
On the issue of wealth sharing, the first thing we ask is compensation. The government,
supported by the Janjaweed, intentionally inflicted damage on whole villages.
Reconciliation based on compensation: that is tradition, that is culture and
that is part of our believing. We have been calling for a commission where everybody
who claims that his property was stolen or destroyed, should be compensated.
Reconstruction is a priority. [We ask] that 6.5 percent of the national income
be set aside for the reconstruction, rehabilitation and development of Darfur.
The government is rejecting it.
In [terms of] security, the people of Darfur aren’t properly represented
in the army. Had we been properly represented, we wouldn’t have been
killed in the manner in which we were. To make the balance, we ask for the
retaining
of the movement forces during the transitional period, because we cannot
make sure that the government is going to implement whichever agreement we
are going
to reach unless we have some guarantees. Our forces should be trained properly
and at the end of the transitional period they will be integrated into the
army with different ranks. We want entry into military colleges because they
produce
officers.
We have called for reformation. The Janjaweed have been absorbed in the army
and border police. We want them removed, and unconditionally and immediately
disarmed. Although [the] UN Security Council has issued [several resolutions
calling for disarmament], the Sudanese government hasn’t disarmed them.
We have been telling the world the Sudan government cannot disarm the Janjaweed
because they are the Janjaweed. They finance it, they control it, they command
it and they support it.
So the current peace agreement does not address your demands?
The AU and the international community have produced a document
that they know we are not going to sign. In terms of compensation,
they gave a very loose
term, because it is written in a language that nobody understands. [Shows
marked up
draft document text and reads], “The government of Sudan shall support
the compensation fund by making contributions into it.” What is this?
There is no timetable, [no indication of] how much, no modalities, no implementation
mechanism and no guarantees. Establishment of the region is not there.
Compensation of the people is not there. Reconstruction is not there. Representation
of
people
in the presidency and vice presidency and civil services is not there.
This is not an agreement.
If you go over the whole thing, you will find every word is giving goodwill
to the government. We are working with a government that doesn’t
honor its commitments.
By signing this agreement we are legitimizing the dominance of the North
on our people. Now someone from the North can say to my son, ‘your father signed
this, that is what you deserve.’ This agreement is going to be part
of our constitution. So we are constitutionalizing the marginalization
of Darfur.
That is why we say no.
Have you had a lot of pressure from the U.S. government to sign the agreement?
The U.S. has contributed a lot in the beginning, as a government, as a media,
as NGOs, in general. The U.S. was the first country to analyze and confirm the
genocide that is taking place. But here in this process, they try to make a really
quick peace, and by putting pressure on the parties, they did not address the
root causes.
We, the JEM and SLM, have a joint position and made the necessary amendments
in the text that address the root causes of the problem in Darfur and presented
that copy. The AU insisted that this is a take it or leave it document. They
said they are not going to add even a comma.
When we sat with Mr. Zoellick, he said [checks his notepad], “Finding solutions
is difficult, but it is not impossible, indeed it is possible. People of Darfur
need recognition, you want to participate in the central government, and you
want compensation.” That is all our demands. But the AU refused to accept
any amendment. When Mr. Zoellick and Mr. Hillary [Benn, UK Secretary of State
for International Development] came, they made amendments, but did not go far
enough. They made reasonable amendments in the security, but in terms of power
and wealth sharing, none of them. We strongly believe that unless you solve the
problem politically, socially and economically, it doesn’t make any
sense.
They [the AU and the Nigerian president] have made very considerable harassments.
They are saying you will be responsible for the consequences if you don’t
sign it. We will make people believe you are part of the problem. We will
confiscate your passports. You will be taken to International Criminal
Court (ICC). These
are the threats. They beat the table with their hands. They really create
an environment of terror.
Only one faction of SLM signed. If you go to the net, you will find that the
political advisor to Minni Minawi, the man who signed, said he signed under direct
intimidation. We believe that threatening will not solve any crisis. Even if
you take my passport, that is not the end of the problem.
You left the talks and came to the U.S. What is your purpose here?
We are coming to tell the people in the U.S. the nature of the agreement and
why we refuse to sign. We are telling them a partial peace is not a peace.
People are very sympathetic to Darfur, but they are sympathetic from the point
of view of the humanitarian [crisis]. But unless you address the root causes,
the humanitarian situation cannot be resolved. If you want to make the IDPs and
refugees go back to their homes, unless you address the root causes nobody will
go. That is why, after signing this agreement, all the political parties in Sudan
rejected this agreement. Secondly, all the university students were protesting.
Six IDPs were killed. At the moment we are speaking the IDPs and refugees are
demonstrating.
We want to sign; we want to have a peace. We (JEM) are now giving two options:
We are either going to convene another round of talks, which is very difficult,
or we call for a small session—three to five people from the movements,
with their leaders in the presence of the U.S., UN and AU—to make
decisions on the most hot areas: compensation, reconstruction of Darfur,
balance of
power, and having regional identity.
In recent times, the violence has spread to Chad. Does the agreement address
that?
It is part of exporting the problems. Now the world is coming with a very strong
voice to disarm the Janjaweed. The Sudan government considers Darfur and Chad
as the same battlefield. If they manage to topple the government in Chad, then
they will be able to export the Janjaweed to Chad. They will be relieved of their
responsibility of disarming them because they are not in their country. It is
far better for us and the government to find a practical solution to the crisis,
rather than to destabilize other countries and export the Janjaweed.
What are your thoughts on the AU, UN or NATO involvement with disarmament or
keeping peace? People have been saying if there is a peace that is signed it
can be a pathway to get UN troops there to observe the peace.
This is also lack of information. Troops do not bring peace in any country. Many
countries, when their population and their people rally, instead of trying to
be patient and address the causes, they will just rush in. They will also risk
losing their lives, which is not good.
The UN and other superpowers should try to make a peace. Peace itself is more
important than sending troops. You cannot impose peace. You can send troops to
Darfur or anywhere in the world but the troops cannot bring peace.
We are behind the sending of troops to protect the civilians but, more
importantly, we want a just peace. You don’t need many troops if
there is a peace in Darfur. Also part of the peace should be justice. JEM
has been saying
continuously, let those criminals, not only from the government and the
Janjaweed, but also
from the [rebel] movements, go to the ICC.
What happens in 10 days, with the May 31st deadline?
It is the next deadline to sign. They are going to endorse the document,
and going to make recommendations for the UN Security Council to make sanctions
on the parties who do not sign—another form of intimidation.
In the U.S. now, there are members of the JEM and SLM, those who
signed and those
who didn’t. You are working together here?
Yeah, we are all working together to see the people. They themselves say that
the agreement is far from acceptable. We are friends; we have been fighting together.
We carried out the whole negotiation together. Only in signing, we resisted and
they could not resist.
One thing that is growing in the U.S. is a divestment movement. What are your
thoughts about divesting from Sudan?
All the free world should fight to topple this government. We have to take them
to the court [ICC] because they are killers. The only solution is to give the
rights of people. Insist on a fair election. A government not a result of a ballot
box is not a fair government.
The government depends on economics of course. [Divesting] is an important function
by making the government feel that its practices are known by the world.
What message do you want to convey to Americans?
To make them understand the real problem—why people in Darfur are
fighting. We are trying to explain the agreement did not give the minimal
rights to the
people of Darfur. We are meeting with Senate, state department, Save
Darfur coalition and members of our community here, to make them understand
what kind of document
was produced, why it was produced, how it was presented, but also make
recommendations on how we can breach this divide—what we can do
to avoid more bloodshed.
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