July
1998
Editorial:
Comparison/No Comparison
By Martin Rowe
|
|
|
It is, to offer an understatement
bordering on obscene, difficult to talk about the Holocaust. For
Irving Greenberg,
all talk would be trivial: "No statement, theological or otherwise,"
he said, " should be made that would not be credible in the presence
of burning children." The Holocaust casts a deep shadow over all attempts
at finding meaning in the world. Yet, even as it prompts us to conclude
in the face of such abomination that, as Tadeusz Borowski wrote, "the
whole world is really like a concentration camp; the weak for the strong,"
it remains stubbornly beyond comparison, a viciously unique eruption
of absolute evil in the world. Poet Paul Celan encapsulated the paradox:
"Is then the inexplicable explained by saying that it has occurred
only once in the world? Or is this not inexplicable, that it did occur?
And
has not this, the fact that it did occur, the power to make everything
inexplicable, even the most explicable events?"
Yet, over 50 years after Allied troops marched
into Auschwitz, Treblinka, Bergen-Belsen and other hellholes, we still
use the word "Holocaust." We talk and write about it, film and paint
it, commemorate and and seek to explain it. We also make comparisons
between the Holocaust and other atrocities: whether it is to concentration
camps in the former Yugoslavia, the killing fields of Cambodia, the
horrors of the African slave trade, or the suffering of animals on today's
factory farms and in today's slaughterhouses. No less an authority than
Isaac Bashevis Singer was clear in his comparison. For the animals,
he said, it is an "eternal Treblinka."
What did Singer mean, and what might we mean
when we talk about an "eternal Treblinka" for animals. Historically,
the connections are closer than you might imagine, for as Charles Patterson
notes in a forthcoming book on the Holocaust and animal slaughter, it
was anti-Semitic Henry Ford's use of highly mechanized factory-production
lines to make cars that led to both the modern slaughterhouse and the
destruction of nearly all of European Jewry, millions of Gypsies, homosexuals,
communists, and others. The Nazis loaded their cargo--whom they dehumanized
as "bacilli" or "life unworthy of life"--into cattle cars to ship them
to out-of-the-way places where they could be destroyed. These specimens
were used for scientific experimentation before they died, their valuable
body parts or possessions reincorporated into the economy, and in every
way were denied their dignity and familial relationships. Both the Holocaust
and mechanized animal slaughter--more animals die in 12 hours in the
United States than all those who died in the Holocaust-- it might be
argued represent the absolute rejection of a respect for life, of unthinking
and total slaughter made possible by the dehumanizing dominance of industrialism
and the machine. For the Jews it stopped; for the animals it is neverending.
But the question remains: why make the comparison?
What purpose is served? It is not good enough to compare one with the
other merely to up the ante and quasi-criminalize those who work in
the slaughterhouse industry, or to draw attention to the massive abuse
of power that led to both the Holocaust and continues with mechanized
animal slaughter. I do not think we are passing Greenberg's test on
these criteria. These arguments do not trivialize the Holocaust because
(as some would argue) humans are inherently more important than animals
and that consequently the lives lost in Auschwitz were richer, more
complex, and the loss therefore more tragic than the conveyer-belt victims
of slaughterhouses. I happen to believe in the inherent rights of all
animals--human or non-human--to live a life free from torture or confinement.
Nor do these arguments trivialize the Holocaust because the systems
of destruction were not the same. They were. Animal slaughter may be
more understandable than the Holocaust--perhaps because our collective
guilt is on-going--but the Holocaust is in some ways more viscerally
powerful for us, because human suffering is something we can relate
to more easily than that of animals.
The trivialization lies in comparing the two:
something which unfortunately alienates many humane people of good will
who still believe in the inherent worth of humans over animals. But,
more significantly, comparison dilutes the intensity of both experiences,
and--most crucially--removes the particulars of both events, replacing
them with abstractions of horror, pathos, and despair. By making both
a part of a universal condition of one group's terrible treatment of
those less powerful than it is, we fail to grasp both the individual
suffering and the ways in which we can stop one and make sure the other
never occurs again. Ironically, we are disabled rather than enabled
when our focus is withdrawn from the specifics of either the Holocaust
or continued animal slaughter. Asking "why" impedes us from saying "no
more."
Some have argued that, to the contrary,
making the Holocaust incomparable only feeds the claim that the Jews
are special--a view that can foster Judeophobia as much as Judeophilia.
Others have said that moving it beyond comparison to the mystically
unique abstracts it from history and, perhaps, reality. These points
are well taken, and I'm not sure I can or want to rebut them. But there
is a sense that at the heart of both the Holocaust and animal slaughter
lies an individual silence that fights against the rush to a cosmic
conclusion or comparison. Borowski and possibly Primo Levi knew they
would not be able to understand the experiences of those who died in
the camps this side of the grave, and both killed themselves as a consequence.
While in the end we can never know what it is exactly that animals are
experiencing when they are rounded up and hoisted onto the disassembly
line, their silences--like all those who died in the Holocaust--are
their own. While we should vigorously protest violence against all beings,
and seek to end the obscenities of factory farming and mechanized slaughter,
it is worth recognizing these silences as a warning to us that after
Auschwitz, as George Steiner acknowledged, eloquence and thereby comparison
"would be a kind of obscenity."
|
|
|
|